Internet Applications Design and Implementation (Lecture 6 - on Security)

MIEI - Integrated Master in Computer Science and Informatics Specialization block

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(with previous participations of Jácome Cunha (jacome@fct.unl.pt) and João Leitão (jc.leitao@fct.unl.pt), contributions from Beatriz Moreira, APDC-INV 2017/2018)



- Security is a hot topic in CS in present days!
- **Cryptography** can only protect data **outside of systems**, when properly applied and if there are no "internal" information leaks.
- **Security breaches** are often caused by internal errors that cause: system crashes or erroneous behaviour due to unexpected inputs
- Security breaches are often caused by programming mistakes.

- Good engineering practices and correct usage of methods and tools ensures that all specified data confidentiality rules are properly enforced.
- There are two elective courses in MIEI only about this topic.
 - Software Security: fundamental concepts and technologies
 - Network and Computer Systems Security: system-level security
- This lecture is about models and frameworks that implement software security.

Outline

- Security Concepts Review
- Foundations of Computer Security
- Security Models
- Kotlin and Spring Security
- Model-Based Access Control in Spring

Internet Applications Design and Implementation (Lecture 6 - Part 1 - Security Concepts)

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Security of Internet Applications

- Layers of internet application security
 - Network Level (network security and system identification)
 - System Level (firewalls, VPNs, SSL, DMZ)
 - Application Level (our focus)
 - Authentication
 - Access control
 - Information flow



The Big Picture - Organisation Industry Standards (ISO 27002)

- Definition of General Security policies
- Organization of information security
- Asset management
- Human resources security
- Physical and environmental security
- Communications and operations management
- Access control (data, operations, and other resources)
- Acquisition, development, and maintenance of Software Systems
- Incident management
- Compliance with regulations

About software

Security Policies in Software Systems

- within an software system:
 - "The set of restrictions and properties that specify how a computing system prevents information and computing resources from being used to violate an organizational security policy" in Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann 2011
- Policies define who has permission to access or operate on, a given resource.
 - Access control lists,
 - firewall settings,
 - services that may be run on user devices,
 - security protocols for protecting network traffic,

• ...

Attacks and Attackers

- Security can be defined and challenged based on the definition of attacks and attackers. What does an attacker know and what operations can they perform on a system.
- The correct functioning of a system is based on assumptions on the environment.
- Attacks are designed to challenge system assumptions with illegal inputs, causing illegal states, erroneous behaviour or crashes.



Classic Example: SQL injection



Classic Example: SQL injection





https://www.w3schools.com/sql/sql_injection.asp

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Security flaws in software



https://www.owasp.org/

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Security flaws in software

Δ1

A2

A3

A4

A7

A8

A9

A10

Still Up-to-D



- A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures shifts up one position to #2, previously known as Sensitive Data Exposure, which was broad symptom rather than a root cause. The renewed focus here is on failures related to cryptography which often leads to sensitive data exposure or system compromise.
- A03:2021-Injection slides down to the third position. 94% of the applications were tested for some form of injection, and the 33 CWEs mapped into this category have the second most occurrences in applications. Cross-site Scripting is now part of this category in this edition.
- trol

m.]

- ires • A04:2021-Insecure Design is a new category for 2021, with a focus on risks related to design flaws. If we genuinely want to "move left" as an industry, it calls for more use of threat modeling, secure design patterns and principles, and reference architectures.
- A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration moves up from #6 in the previous edition; 90% of applications were tested for some form of misconfiguration. With more shifts into highly configurable software, it's not surprising to see this category move up. The former category for XML External Entities (XXE) is now part of this category.
- A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components was previously titled Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities and is #2 in the Top 10 community survey, but also had enough data to make the Top 10 via data analysis. This category moves up from #9 in 2017 and is a known issue that we struggle to test and assess risk. It is the only category not to have any Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVEs) mapped to the included CWEs, so a default exploit and impact weights of 5.0 are factored into their scores.
- A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures was previously Broken Authentication and is sliding org/ down from the second position, and now includes CWEs that are more related to identification failures. This category is still an integral part of the Top 10, but the increased availability of standardized frameworks

uration tdated Components Authentication Failures Integrity Failures nd Monitoring Failures* t Forgery (SSRF)*

Internet Applications Design and Imp

Most common attacks are at the application level and can be avoided by properly using well tested and tested frameworks and well established methods.

Internet Applications Design and Implementation (Lecture 6 - Part 2 - Foundations)

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Foundations of Computer Security

- Fundamental Properties:
 - **confidentiality** prevention of unauthorised disclosure of information,
 - **integrity** prevention of unauthorised modification of information,
 - **availability** prevention of unauthorised withholding of information or resources
 - ... more... accountability; non-repudiation; reliability/dependability; ...

"Computer security deals with the prevention and detection of unauthorized actions by users of a computer system" - Dieter Gollmann,

See also the wikipedia page

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Foundations of Software Security

- Main concepts used in software security
 - **Principal** (the active subject)
 - **Resourse** (the passive object)
 - Authentication the principal provides proof that they are who they say they are
 - Authorisation the principal is trusted to access or perform an operation on a resource
 - **Delegation** can you operate on behalf of other principal?
- Declassification operations in confidentiality analysis
- Endorsement operations in integrity analysis

Principal/Authentication

- An authenticated entity (or group) that uses the system
- The active subject on system operations

Authentication:

• The certification process of determining the identity of an external entity that uses the system, invokes actions, produces and consumes data.

Resource/Authorisation

- The process of checking what resources a principal is allowed to access and manipulate, and what operations is it allowed to execute at a given time and system state (data, parameters, context, etc.).
- Authorisation (to observe or change)
 - read, execute, write, append, delete, change access, change ownership, ...
 - Classic access control models
 - Access Control Matrix
 - Capabilities
 - Access Control Lists

Authorisation and access control models

- Base models
 - Access Control Matrix; Capabilities; Access Control Lists
- Intermediate control structures



Authorisation and access control models

- Base models
 - Access Control Matrix; Capabilities; Access Control Lists
- Intermediate control structures



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Internet Applications Design and Implementation (Lecture 6 - Part 3 - Security Models)

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Security Models

- Access Control List
- Capability-based access control
- Role-based access control
- Bell–LaPadula model for confidentiality
- Biba Integrity model for data integrity
- Model-based access control

Access Control Lists

- ACLs are lists of permissions (identity, operation) attached to objects stored within the system.
- It must explicitly assign individual identities to operations on resources.
- Spring Security ACL implements ACL on top of explicitly managed database tables



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Capability-based access control

- A decentralised method that provides a scalable approach to access control
 - No need for centralised access control lists and mechanisms;
- A capability refers to an object and a set of rights, the user that owns it can perform the operation described in the capability
 - Example: a pair ("/etc/pass", O_RDWR) gives readwrite access
- Common in micro-service based architectures and IoT scenarios

Capability-based access control

- A capability is transmitted through unforgeable (and ephemeral) tokens
- Capabilities can be explicitly and dynamically managed
 - Good support for authorisation and delegation
- To perform an operation on a particular object, the principal has first to acquire the associated capability via some dynamic authorisation method.

Role-Base Access Control

- Standard approach to authorise users to perform operations in software systems.
 - Roles are specified for system related tasks
 - Permissions are assigned to specific roles

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https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c3/RBAC.jpg

Role-Base Access Control

- Standard approach to authorise users to perform operations in software systems.
 - Roles are specified for system related tasks
 - Permissions are assigned to specific roles



Bell–LaPadula model - Confidentiality

- Formalises the U.S. Department of Defense multilevel security policies.
- The security level of a subject is compared to the classification of the object (and the security compartment where it is stored)
- The access control rules state that:
 - A subject cannot read up
 - A subject cannot write down
 - + an access control matrix

	TOP SECRET
nt	SECRET
	CONFIDENTIAL
	PUBLIC
	No Write Down

No Read Up

Information Flow Control - Confidentiality

- The process of ensuring that data is only seen by trusted principals. This involves assigning a level of trust to data and principals.
- General technique to check it is called **information flow control**
- Declassification: The process of lowering the level of trust needed to access a given data item.
 Operating R.S. Gaines

var high = 1 var low = \dots 10 + high \dots

var low = 2 if (high > 0) low else 3

Operating Systems	R.S. Gaines
A Lattic Secure I	e Model of nformation
FIOW Dorothy E. Den Purdue Universi	ning ity

Biba Integrity model - Data Integrity

- Data integrity has three goals:
 - Prevent data modification by unauthorised principals
 - Prevent unauthorised data modification by authorised principals
 - Maintain internal and external data consistency
- The access control rules state that:
 - A subject cannot read up
 - A subject cannot write down
 - + an access control matrix

TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
PUBLIC
No Read Down

No Write Up

Information Flow Control - Data Integrity

- The process of ensuring that data is only provided by trusted principals.
- Also an information flow control property (dual of confidentiality)
- Endorsement: the process of increasing the level of trust o a given data item.

```
Operating
                                                                                                                                                    R.S. Gaines
                                                                                                                                                    Editor
                                                                                                                   Systems
                                                                                                                    A Lattice Model of
                                                                                                                   Secure Information
                                                                                                                   Flow
             var untrusted = 1
                                                                                                                                                                                 Hybrid Information Flow Control for Low-level
                                                                                                                   Dorothy E. Denning
             var trusted = \dots 10 + untrusted
                                                                                                                                                                                                            Code
                                                                                                                   Purdue University
                                                                                                                                                                                      Eduardo Geraldo<sup>1</sup>, José Fragoso Santos<sup>2</sup>, and João Costa Seco<sup>1</sup>
                                                                                                                                                                                           <sup>1</sup> NOVA LINCS - NOVA University Lisbon, Portugal
                                                                                                                                                                                            <sup>2</sup> Instituto Superior Técnico & INESC-ID, Portugal
             var trusted = 2
             if (untrusted > 0) trusted else 3
                                                                                                                                                 SNIFFER: Information Flow Aware Test Generation for SNITCH*
                                                                                                                                                Abstract
                                                                                                                                                                                              1 Introduction
                                                                                                                                                Verifying security properties in Software Systems is a cumbersome
                                                                                                                                                                                              Testing is the de facto industrial method used for validating soft-
                                                                                                                                                and painful task. Despite sophisticated techniques for detecting
                                                                                                                                                                                              ware and detecting programming mistakes in software systems.
                                                                                                                                                information leaks, such as information flow aware static type sys-
                                                                                                                                                                                              Unfortunately, the trend for increasingly larger systems leads to
                                                                                                                                                                                              ever-increasing codebases, harder to test and maintain. Rapidly
                                                                                                                                                tems and runtime reference monitors, the actual adoption in real
                                                                                                                                                code is not significant. Relevant factors include the conservative
                                                                                                                                                                                              expanding codebases, and the pervasiveness of critical systems
Internet Applications Design and Implementation, NOVA SST, © 2015, João Costa Seco, Jácome Cunha, João Leitão
                                                                                                                                                character of the static analysis tools and the impractical need for
                                                                                                                                                                                              make it almost impossible to manually design test cases in a timely
```

many test cases, taking into account the subtleties of data security

fashion. Automatic test generation is a promising alternative for

- Security conditions are many times hidden in query filters and program conditions. These policies are very difficult to get right, maintain, and modify.
- Developer-defined roles usually depend on the current state of the application. (e.g. ModeratorOf(...)). Role-based models usually ignore this and require the application logic to validate it.
- Example: authorisations usually depend on the state of the target entity (status == "submitted")
- Capabilities defined by the developer can extend the standard read/write/delete (not hardwired to the basic programming elements)





by static typing. Our development is based on the general concept of refinement type, but extended so as to address realistic and challenging scenarios of permission-based data security in which policies dynamically depend on the database state and flexible

91

Model-Based Access Control



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292

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ABSTRACT

(2006.01)

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Sep. 19, 2013

717/104

(43) Pub. Date:

Model

Validator

104

108

106

112

- 110

G06F 9/44

G06F 9/45

LISDC

Further Reading

Computer Security. Dieter Gollmann. 3rd edition. Wiley, 2011. OWASP Testing Guide V4. Owasp foundation, 2016. <u>https://www.owasp.org/images/1/19/OTGv4.pdf</u>

- CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (A1, A6)
- Authentication, authorization, non-repudiation (A1, A2, A6)
- Risk, threats, vulnerabilities, and attack vectors (A3, A6)
- Concept of trust and trustworthiness (A4)
- Threat and attacker modelling (A3, A5, B1)
- Identification and authentication (A2, B3)
- Authorization and access control models (B2, B4, B5)
- Defensive programming (C2, D1)
- Software security testing (A5, C2, D2)
- Secure design basic principles (B2, B4, C1)
- Security best practices and standards (B3, B4, B5, B6, C2)
- Techniques for preserving security across modules and trust maintenance (A4, B1, B6, D1, D2, D3)
- Web security model (B6)
- Session management, authentication (B3, C3)
- Web application vulnerabilities and defenses (A5, B1, C3, C4)
- Client-side security (C4, D3, D4)
- Server-side security tools (C4, D3, D5)



Internet Applications Design and Implementation (Lecture 6 - Part 4 - Using Kotlin & Spring)

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Using frameworks for security

• Frameworks such as Spring, with Spring Security project promote the reuse of (correct) code, good practices, and great number of base features.

Spring	Security 5.4.1	
OVERVIEW	LEARN	

Spring Security is a powerful and highly customizable authentication and access-control framework. It is the de-facto standard for securing Spring-based applications.

Spring Security is a framework that focuses on providing both authentication and authorization to Java applications. Like all Spring projects, the real power of Spring Security is found in how easily it can be extended to meet custom requirements

https://spring.io/projects/spring-security

Using frameworks for security

- Frameworks such as Spring Security promote the reuse of (correct) code, good practices, and great number of base features.
 - HTTP BASIC authentication headers (an IETF RFC-based standard)
 - HTTP Digest authentication headers (an IETF RFC-based standard)
 - HTTP X.509 client certificate exchange (an IETF RFC-based standard)
 - · LDAP (a very common approach to cross-platform authentication needs, especially in large environments)
 - · Form-based authentication (for simple user interface needs)
 - OpenID authentication
 - · Authentication based on pre-established request headers (such as Computer Associates Siteminder)
 - JA-SIG Central Authentication Service (otherwise known as CAS, which is a popular open source single sign-on system)
 - Transparent authentication context propagation for Remote Method Invocation (RMI) and HttpInvoker (a Spring remoting protocol)
 - Automatic "remember me" authentication (so you can tick a box to avoid re-authentication for a predetermined period of time)
 - · Anonymous authentication (allowing every unauthenticated call to automatically assume a particular security identity)
 - Run-as authentication (which is useful if one call should proceed with a different security identity)
 - Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS)
 - JEE container autentication (so you can still use Container Managed Authentication if desired)
 - Kerberos

- By just including the dependency in the application, security is automatically enabled.

<dependency>

<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
 <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifactId>
</dependency>

<dependency>
 <groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId>
 <artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId>
 <scope>test</scope>
</dependency>

 Configuration is then possible by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.

https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/

By just including the dependence enabled.

<dependency>

<proupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId> <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifact/dependency>

<dependency>

<proupId>org.springframework.security</proupId> <artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId> <scope>test</scope> </dependency>

 Configuration is then possible by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.



https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/ https://spring.io/guides/topicals/spring-security-architecture

 By just including the dependency i enabled.

```
<dependency>
```

```
<proupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifactI
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>
```

```
<proupId>org.springframework.security</proupId>
<artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
```

 Configuration is then possible by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.

```
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
class WebSecurityConfig : WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter() {
    @Throws(Exception::class)
    override fun configure(http: HttpSecurity) {
        http
        .authorizeRequests()
            .antMatchers("/" ).permitAll()
            .anyRequest().authenticated()
            .and()
        .formLogin()
            .permitAll()
            .and()
        .logout()
            .permitAll()
    }
    @Bean
    public override fun userDetailsService(): UserDetailsService {
        val user: UserDetails = User.withDefaultPasswordEncoder()
                 .username("user")
                 .password("password")
                 .roles("USER")
                 .build()
        return InMemoryUserDetailsManager(user)
    }
}
```

• By just including the dependency i class WebSecurityConfig : WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter() {
enabled.

@Configuration

<dependency>

<groupId>org.springframework.b
<artifactId>spring-boot-starte
</dependency>

<dependency>

<groupId>org.springframework.se <artifactId>spring-security-tes <scope>test</scope> </dependency>

 Configuration is ther by declaring basic a properties and basic used information.

	Security) {
Please sign in	<pre>cAll() ced()</pre>
Username	
Password	
Sign in	arvice(): UserDetailsService {
	.withDefaultPasswordEncoder()
)
	nager(user)
}	

By just including the dependen ^{@Configuration} enabled.

<dependency>

<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId> <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</arti</pre> </dependency>

<dependency>

<groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId</pre> <artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId> <scope>test</scope> </dependency>

Configuration is then possible by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.



https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/

}



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• By just including	jcs@Joaos-iMac ~ % http :8080/applications]
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chabled.	Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate	
, demanden er t	Content-Type: application/ison	
<dependency></dependency>	Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 14:30:34 GMT	
<group1a>org.springfram</group1a>	Expires: 0	
<artifactia>spring-boot</artifactia>	Keep-Alive: timeout=60	
	Pragma: no-cache	
	Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=2454FD5814FB3EEBF80E0/CF1/3/C10D; Path=/; HttpOnly	
<dependency></dependency>	X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff	
<proupid>org.springfram</proupid>	X-Frame-Options: DENY	agerBuilder) {
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	}	
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iniormation.	https://spring.io/guides/gs/secur	ina-web/

https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/

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 By just including 	● ● ●	
	jcs@Joaos-iMac ~ % http :8080/applicationsauth user:password]
enabled.	<u>HTTP/1.1 200</u>	ter() {
	Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate	
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<arountd>ora sprinaframe</arountd>	Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 14:57:40 GMT	
<pre></pre>	Expires: 0	
/dependency/s	Keep-Alive: timeout=60	
	Pragma: no-cache	
designed as a set	Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=2361CEB5951A39C2967863030D2EBA48; Path=/; HttpOnly	
<aepenaency></aepenaency>	Iransfer-Encoding: chunked	
<group1d>org.springframe</group1d>	X-Ename-Ontions: DENY	gerBuilder) {
<artifactid>spring-secur</artifactid>	X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block	5 , (
<scope>test</scope>		
	[]	<pre>ncode("password"))</pre>
Configuration is	JCS@JOAOS-1MAC ~ %	
• Configuration is		der())
hy declaring has		
by acciantly ba		
properties and h		
information.	https://spring.jo/quides/as/securing-	web/



• The default security setting provides that all requests are protected, a login form is created, RESTful interface for login/logout...

```
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
public class SecurityConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
    @Autowired
    public void configureGlobal(AuthenticationManagerBuilder auth) throws Exception {
        auth
        .inMemoryAuthentication()
        .withUser("user").password("password").roles("USER");
    }
}
```

Look into the documentation for the up-to-date API!!

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Fundamental Concepts mapped to Spring Context



• Principal - Who is the entity behind a particular request

@RequestMapping("/messages/inbox")
public ModelAndView findMessagesForUser(@AuthenticationPrincipal CustomUser user) {

// .. find messages for this user and return them ...

• Authentication: Certify that a given set of credentials identify one principal

```
@Autowired
public void configureGlobal(AuthenticationManagerBuilder auth) throws Exception {
    auth
    .jdbcAuthentication()
    .dataSource(dataSource)
    .withDefaultSchema()
    .withUser("user").password("password").roles("USER").and()
    .withUser("admin").password("password").roles("USER", "ADMIN");
}
```

Look into the documentation for the up-to-date API!!

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Linking to the application model



• Dynamic verification of user credentials is part of the application model

```
override fun configure(auth: AuthenticationManagerBuilder) {
    auth.inMemoryAuthentication()
    .withUser( username: "user")
    .password(BCryptPasswordEncoder().encode( rawPassword: "password"))
    .authorities(emptyList())
    .and()
    .passwordEncoder(BCryptPasswordEncoder())
    .and()
    .userDetailsService(customUserDetails)
}
```

Look into the documentation for the up-to-date API!!

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Linking to the application model



Dynamic verification of user credentials is part of the application model



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• Authorisation - Check if a given principal has rights to access a given piece of information

```
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
    http
        .authorizeRequests()
        .antMatchers("/resources/**", "/signup", "/about").permitAll()
        .antMatchers("/admin/**").hasRole("ADMIN")
        .antMatchers("/db/**").access("hasRole('ROLE_ADMIN') and hasRole('ROLE_DBA')")
        .anyRequest().authenticated()
        .and()
        // ...
        .formLogin();
}
```

 Delegation - to be able to temporarily assign one principals capabilities' to another principal (e.g. sudo)

> http://docs.spring.io/autorepo/docs/spring-security/3.2.1.RELEASE/apidocs/ org/springframework/security/web/authentication/switchuser/SwitchUserFilter.html

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org.springiramework.security.web.autrientication.switch

Class SwitchUserFilter

java.lang.Object

org.springframework.web.filter.GenericFilterBean

org.springframework.security.web.authentication.switchuser.SwitchUserFilter

All Implemented Interfaces:

javax.servlet.Filter, Aware, BeanNameAware, DisposableBean, InitializingBean, Ap

Basic Spring Security Guaranties

There really isn't much to this configuration, but it does a lot. You can find a summary of the features below:

- Require authentication to every URL in your application
- Generate a login form for you
- Allow the user with the Username user and the Password password to authenticate with form based authentication
- Allow the user to logout
- <u>CSRF attack</u> prevention
- <u>Session Fixation</u> protection
- Security Header integration
 - <u>HTTP Strict Transport Security</u> for secure requests
 - <u>X-Content-Type-Options</u> integration
 - Cache Control (can be overridden later by your application to allow caching of your static resources)

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From Spring Security docs

Basic Spring Security Guaranties

- · Security Header integration
 - <u>HTTP Strict Transport Security</u> for secure requests
 - <u>X-Content-Type-Options</u> integration
 - · Cache Control (can be overridden later by your application to allow caching of your static resources)
 - <u>X-XSS-Protection</u> integration
 - X-Frame-Options integration to help prevent <u>Clickjacking</u>
- Integrate with the following Servlet API methods
 - <u>HttpServletRequest#getRemoteUser()</u>
 - <u>HttpServletRequest.html#getUserPrincipal()</u>
 - <u>HttpServletRequest.html#isUserInRole(java.lang.String)</u>
 - <u>HttpServletRequest.html#login(java.lang.String, java.lang.String)</u>
 - <u>HttpServletRequest.html#logout()</u>

From Spring Security docs

CSRF - token issued by the server / recognised by the same server

6. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

This section discusses Spring Security's Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) support.

6.1. CSRF Attacks

Before we discuss how Spring Security can protect applications from CSRF attacks, we will explain what a CSRF attack is. Let's take a look at a concrete example to get a better understanding.

Assume that your bank's website provides a form that allows transferring money from the currently logged in user to another bank account. For example, the HTTP request might look like:

```
POST /transfer HTTP/1.1
Host: bank.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=randomid; Domain=bank.example.com; Secure; HttpOnly
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
```

```
amount=100.00&routingNumber=1234&account=9876
```

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CSRF - token issued by the server / recognised by the same server

• Template example...

```
<div th:if="${#httpServletRequest.remoteUser}!=null">
   <label>User:&nbsp;</label><span th:text="${#httpServletRequest.remoteUser}"></span>
   <form style="display:inline-block" th:action="@{/logout}" method="post">
        <input type="submit" value="Sign Out"/>
        </form>
</div>
</div>
</div th:if="${#httpServletRequest.remoteUser} == null" >
   <form th:action="@{/}" method="post">
        <label> User : <input type="text" name="username"/> </label>
        <label> User : <input type="feature" name="feature" name="password"/> </label>
        <label> Password: <input type="password" name="password"/> </label>
        <input type="hidden" name="${_csrf.parameterName}" value="${_csrf.token}"/>
        <input type="submit" value="Sign In"/>
        </form>
```

</div>

CSRF - token issued by the server / recognised by the same server

• Actual page example

```
▼ <div class="container">
 ▼ <div>
    ▼ <form method="post" action="/">
     <label>
         " User : "
        <input type="text" name="username">
       </label>
     ▼ <label>
         " Password: "
        <input type="password" name="password">
       </label>
     > <input type="hidden" name="${_csrf.parameterName}" value="${_csrf.token}">
     <input type="submit" value="Sign In">
      <input type="hidden" name="_csrf" value="f067a25f-c6f5-4de0-b6ad-ea7416986b22">
     </form>
    </div>
 </div>
-/divs
```