

# Departamento de Informática Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA

# Curso de Mestrado em Engenharia Informática (2º Ciclo)

Segurança em Sistemas e Redes de Computadores (Computer Systems and Networks Security, MSc Level)

# 1° Sem. 2010/2011 TESTE DE FREQUÊNCIA N° 1 (Frequency Test 1)

Test duration: 2 hours

GROUP 1 (Closed book)

The test has two groups of questions

• Group 1: Answers with closed book: 1 hour

• Group 2: It is possible to use reference documentation and materials: 1 hour

Student Number:	Name:	
LEI/MEI:	Group: SSTC-G	Total number of pages:

You should number each page in the form: Page Number/TOTAL

# EVALUATION TABLE (to be used by the teacher)

	(								
1)	2)	3)	4)	5)	6)	7)	8)	9)	10)
GROU	JP 2								
1)	2)	3)	4)	5)	6)	7)	8)	9)	10)
,		- /							,

- a) According with the X.800 Security Framework, what are the differences between passive and active threats?
- b) List and briefly define categories of passive and active security attacks, as defined in the X.800 framework.

Passive Attacks:

P1 -

P2 -

Active Attacks

A1 –

A2 -

A3 -

A4 -


A5 -

c) From the following table, describing the relationship between security services and security mechanisms, try to fill a table representing similar relationships between the specific represented security mechanisms and a list of passive and active attacks, as mentioned in b). You must consider in the table the same passive and active attacks mentioned in P1, P2, A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5.

If you need to argument your choices, use the indexes M1, M2, etc to justify your answer.

Service	Enciph- erment	Digital signature	Access control	Data integrity	Authenti- cation exchange	Traffic padding	Routing control	Notari- zation
Peer entity authentication	Y	Y			Y			
Data origin authentication	Y	Y						
Access control			Y					
Confidentiality	Y						Y	
Traffic flow confidentiality	Y					Y	Y	
Data integrity	Y	Y		Y				
Non-repudiation		Y		Y				Y
Availability				Y	Y			

Mechanism		Passive A	Attacks	Active :	Active attacks			
		P1	P2	A1	A2	A3	A4	
M1	AES Algorithm							
M2	CMAC with 3DES and							
	CBC							
M3	Switched LAN Access							
	Control based on assigned							
	MAC addresses (in each							
	switch port)							
M4	SHA-512 Algorithm							
M5	HMAC with SHA-1							
	and/or MD5							
M6	Introduction of random							
	traffic padding in a data-							
	stream message, before							
M7	encryption							
IVI /	Encryption of a							
	Message Digest with a							
3.50	RSA private Key							
M8	Encryption with a RSA							
	public key							
M9	PKCS#7 used in							
	plaintext encrypted							
	with AES and CBC							
	Mode							
M10	Authentication							
	auditable LOGs							
	maintained by a KDC							
	running the Needham-							
	Schroeder Algorithm							
	for Key-Distribution							
	Tot Icey Distribution	L						



# **Question 3**

a) In general, in a Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB), the encryption of a message composed by a number of N blocks, each one with size b bits, is expressed in the following way:

```
C1 = P1s \text{ xor } Ss (\{IV\}k) \text{ and } Ci = Pi \text{ xor } Ss (\{Ci-1\}k), \text{ for any } i
```

Remembering:

• Ss(X) corresponds to a shift-left operation of b-s bits, of the block X with initial size b, selecting only the most significant s bits for the xor operation (discarding the b-s least significant bits). As you remember, for byte-oriented encryption, s = 8 bits

Write the expression to compute P1 and Ci in the decryption phase:

P1 =

Ci =

# **Question 4**

Why is the middle step of a 3DES (Triple DES) a decryption step, rather than an encryption step? Justify the answer.

When certain cipher modes of operation are used, we only need an algorithm implementing the encryption function, because the decryption is done also with the encryption function. Show how this can be done?
Question 6
a) Explain the difference between weak-collision resistance and strong-collision resistance as different properties in a secure hashing function.
b) List the other important properties (complementing the properties above) that a secure hash function must satisfy to be used as a component for a message authentication code (or MAC) scheme. Describe each property.

When using a PBE encryption scheme to encrypt a message M, the values of the password, salt and counter (as input parameters) must be kept secret and shared between the two principal making the encryption and the decryption computation. True or False? Argument your answer, starting form the operation and characteristics of PBE-Encryption support. Suggestion: remember the PBE-Encryption programming support as provided in Java JCA/JCE Programming.

### **Ouestion 8**

a) Which is the generic structure of a HMAC scheme composed by two secure hash-functions? Explain the motivation to adopt two different secure hash-functions as key-elements of a two-secure hash computation.

b) Explain the generic structure and design principles of a CMAC scheme based on a CBC mode.

c) What are the advantages or disadvantages between HMACs and CMACs to be used as MAC schemes as integrity and non-replaying warranties in the implementation of the Needham-Schroeder Protocol, as implemented in the first practical work-assignment (TP1)?

#### **GROUP 2**

### Question 9 (estimated time: 10 min max.)

Consider the listed program that uses PBE decryption and its logic to decrypt a ciphertext previously obtained by a non-PBE encryption scheme, from an initial plaintext message. You must know why this program works fine and why the PBE decryption obtains the initial plaintext in a correct way (as shown in the printed output)

a) If you change the line:

Cipher cEnc= Cipher.getInstance("DESede/CBC/PKCS5Padding", "BC")

by the line

Cipher eEnc=Cipher.getInstance("DESede/CBC/PKCS7Padding", "BC")

the output of the program (last 4 lines) will change or not? By other words, the PBE decryption will obtain the correct plaintext as previously or not? Explain why, justifying your answer.

c) Repeat your answer if the same code line is changed by the following line:

Cipher eEnc=Cipher.getInstance("DESede/CBC/NoPadding", "BC")

### Question 10 (estimated time: 10 min, max)

- a) From the listed program (based in an example discussed in the classroom), simulate a tampering attack (adding lines in the code), resulting in a transfer of 5000000 to the attacker account 9876-5432, just by forging in the encrypted channel a fake message with a fake content: Transfer 5000000 to AC 9876-5432.
- b) Explain why your attack has success?
- c) Explain if such attack is possible if we change the Counter mode by another byte-oriented mode, such as OFB. Why?

### Question 11 (estimated time: 5 to 10 min)

Considering the context of the TP1 (work assignment): suppose that we will use a fixed *ciphersuite* using DES as a symmetric algorithm to implement the Needham-Schroeder protocol (Phase 2 of TP1) for the base of the authentication and key-session distribution protocol for chat sessions, knowing that the *ciphersuite* defined for the sessions can use different symmetric algorithms, namely: AES, Triple DES and Blowfish.

From you opinion does it makes sense? Justify your answer in the perspective that you must warrant the security properties (authentication, confidentiality, integrity and protection against message-relaying) in the communication between principals involved in those different chat sessions